With the government letting former defence chiefs retreat into relative oblivion.
INDIA'S BEST COLLEGES, INSTITUTES and UNIVERSITIES
INDIA'S BEST COLLEGES, INSTITUTES and UNIVERSITIES
When the top brass of the Army, Air Force or Navy, after having served the Indian armed forces with distinction for decades, retire and move on, where do they end up? In an ideal situation, many of them would be roped in by the government machinery to give shape and substance to the nation's long-term and immediate military strategy. With their wealth of experience, exposure and expertise, they would be more eminently qualified than anybody else for the task. Unfortunately, in India, most generals, air chiefs and admirals are allowed to go into virtual oblivion post-retirement as politicians and handpicked bureaucrats rule the defence roost.
And that amounts to a huge waste of a wonderful pool of talent. Military diplomacy is today an integral part of foreign policy. No country, least of all a steadily growing economic and geopolitical powerhouse as India, can afford to sit on its haunches and wait for things to happen. Proactive is the way to be. In this sensitive scenario, the role of specialists, of battle-scarred veterans, can never be over-emphasized. When the national interest is involved, nothing could be more beneficial than picking the brains of men who have been there, done that.
Is the Indian government doing enough of that? There are signs that it is mindful of the need to put superannuated defence bigwigs to better use. For one, the government has decided to appoint retired Army officers as advisers on matters related to Naxal-affected states. Recently, the commissioning of INS Shivalik, the world's biggest stealth ship, was also done under the able supervision of a retired Navy officer, Vice Admiral H S Malhi. But these measures, sporadic as they are, smack of tokenism.
Why is it so difficult for the government to tap the experience and expertise of the generals, air chiefs and admirals? Strategic affairs analyst K Subrahmanyam says, 'The trouble is that the government will never pick an officer who does not fit into its scheme of things. A lot needs to be done. The current system has far too many anomalies.' In other words, wary of loose cannons, the government prefers to err on the side of caution. In the bargain it loses out on getting the best advice and guidance in matters of security infrastructure, strategy planning and manpower deployment in conflict zones. 'General' atrophy Contrast that with the situation in the US. President Barack Obama's national security adviser is a retired general, James Jones, who knows the in and outs of military planning like the back of his hand. Gen. Jones has vast battlefield experience ' he brings that knowledge to be the table in his capacity as White House's military strategy fulcrum. He was recently in India to discuss strategic issues with the leadership in Delhi, as was Admiral Mike Mullen. The latter was in Delhi as Obama's personal emissary. In the UK, the Chief of Defence Staff is the professional head of the armed forces and the principal military adviser to the Secretary of State for Defence and the Government. In USA the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is by law the highest ranking military officer in the armed forces, and the principal military adviser to the President of the US. The National Security Council and the Secretary of defence. The Chairman is senior to all respective heads of each service branch but does not have operational command authority over them or their service branches. The post of NSA in the US has been held quite often by a retired military officer.
Men like General V P Malik, Admiral Arun Prakash and Air Chief Marshal S P Tyagi, on the other hand, are rarely, if ever, pressed into service to bolster India's security set-up. ACM Tyagi, former chief of air staff, now 65 years old, was involved in action during the 1965 and 1971 wars. He could contribute a great deal to India's defence planning if only the government was willing to use his services. He is currently a member of the National Security Advisory Board (NASB), a largely ineffectual body. Much the same could be said about 71-year-old General Malik. He was the Army chief during the Kargil conflict. He is still actively involved in independently developing discourses on defence matters, but the government never sees it fit to turn to the Panchkula-based war veteran for advice.
Admiral Prakash, former naval chief who is known for his expertise in maritime strategy, is a part of the NSAB, which has hardly served the purpose it was meant to. The problems that India faces at this juncture demands solutions on the political and social levels. But in this era of coalition governments, the security of the nation is often subjugated to the politics of convenience. Politicians are more concerned about keeping their constituencies happy than about taking proactive measures to bolster the nation's defence preparedness on all fronts.
Says former Air Chief S Krishnaswamy: 'The issue of making use of the experience and expertise of the military specialists personnel needs serious deliberation. Areas should be identified where retired armed forces personnel can give their the best to the system.' But as things stand, that seems easier said than done. It calls for a complete overhaul of the thinking processes of those who wield political power as well as the men who control the defence establishment. 'General' atrophy Experienced defence personnel do possess the wherewithal to help the government counter the threat posed by Maoist rebels in several parts of India. The government has turned to specialists in this area and is using the retired major generals and brigadiers to chalk out anti-Maoist plans. Matters related to internal and external security are too complex for a man without prior experience to comprehend.
Gen. Malik was in the thick of the Kargil conflict of 1999, which left 524 Indian soldiers dead and more than 1,300 maimed. He knows a thing or two about military operations. The reports of the Kargil Committee and the Group of Ministers had recommended that the defence establishment be fully integrated into the national security apparatus. More than ten years on, nothing has changed. Says Gen. Malik: 'The system needs to improve. We aren't consulted even on issues of high importance. The purchase of aircraft and tanks are made with the approval of the Cabinet Committee on Security. The defence chiefs are not on that committee.'
The defence think tanks that have come into existence in the last decade have become a sort of sinecure for retired armed forces officers. They provide a platform for experience sharing and knowledge dissemination all right, but the views of the men in uniform who have seen battlefield action are rarely factored into the the nation's military planning and long-term strategic vision.
What's worse is that a feeling has spread among officers of the armed forces that they are deliberately kept out of the decision-making process even when they are in service. Post-retirement, the situation tends to gets worse. Says strategic affairs expert Commodore Uday Bhaskar: 'The fauji is kept at arm's length by the powers that be. It is not just retired officers who are not consulted. The bigger problem is that even serving defence officers are excluded from the decision-making process.' Admiral Prakash is a thinking officer revered in the strategic community for his grasp on the subject. He says: 'The US President receives first-hand advice on national security issues the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His current national security adviser is a retired general and, till recently, his director of national intelligence was a retired admiral.' 'General' atrophy He adds: 'Oddly enough, the Indian political establishment has flinched not just from clearly defining national aims and objectives but also from providing guidance regarding strategic parameters to the country's armed forces leadership. Every military operation since Independence, from the 1947 Indo-Pakistan war to the 2002 general mobilisation, has been guided more by political rhetoric than by strategic direction.'
His suggestion, and that of many others, is clear: while the integration of the armed forces headquarters with the Ministry of Defence may remain a distant dream, it is surely time for all national security stakeholders to sit and talk to each other.
Former Air Chief Tyagi, while analysing India's evolving geopolitical and military interests, asserts that the country cannot afford to let things drift anymore. 'Politicians depend on bureaucrats and vice versa. They are at ease with each other. Ironically, on issues pertaining to security and defence, the armed forces are the last to be consulted. This needs to change as soon as possible,' says the former Air Chief.
He points to a major shift that is going to affect the entire decision making set-up. 'Until now every war has been within the geographical limits of the country. The scenario is changing with issues like energy security and economic interests acquiring increasing importance. This will demand more mature and delicate handling. As we grow bigger as a nation, military diplomacy will become more central to our existence than ever before,' he explains.
The country's interests are now scattered as wide as African and American continents। The success story of the Indian economy hinges on an uninterrupted supply of energy। Moreover, the armed forces are required to play key roles in a variety of crisis situations these days। For instance, the Indian Navy had to step in to evacuate people of Indian origin in Lebanon. More recently, in June, Indians caught in the riots in Kyrgyzstan had to be ferried to safety. Experts feel that such requirements can only increase and the country needs to be fully prepared for such transcontinental contingencies. And for this our national security arrangements are crying out for an urgent course correction.
Bring in the specialists By Major General (retd) G.D. Bakshi
Post independence, the national security and strategy decision making was taken over by the intelligence people. They had direct access to the Prime Minister. Usually they had long, stable tenures. B N Mallick served for 12 years, R N Kao for eight years and so on. Even M K Narayanan has had two tenures of four years each. Now, since they were close to the decision makers, it is quite obvious that their influence on the policy was far higher than it should have been. At that time, even the armed forces chiefs had to go through the bureaucratic interface before they could pitch in their advice. This changed in between for some time when an institution named the National Security Advisor was created, and it became a convergence point.
The awareness on the military and national security matters in our country is abysmal. It is really unfortunate that even after 60 years of independence, we have not been able to start an informed debate on the matters of national security. The lack of knowledge of these issues among our political class is what makes them wary of armed forces people. Therefore, it has become a vicious cycle' the less you know, the less you consult. We must change this trend. We have had people at the helm who had good knowledge of security issues. Former defence secretary A V Singh was a person who understood the nuances of security and defence quite well.
We need to understand that hard power is as important as soft power is. The specialists from the armed forces should be brought in right from the begining while formulating plans on national security. It will give a chance to the armed forces to give their opinion at the right time. Usually, security forces are consulted at the last moment, when it's already too late. The retired armed forces officers can play a very important role as they are the ones who can create public awareness and start an informed discourse. They can be part of the think tanks, can be members of certain committees or can work as advisors to ministers as and when required. Armed with the concrete information and counsel that these retired officers can provide, the politicians will surely be in a better position to take informed decisions on key security issues. 'General' atrophy This process, at the same time, will inform the consituency from below and if the people are informed on vital issues, they can put pressure on their representatives to take the right decisions. This will have double impact as in the first place the politician himself is informed and then the public will take up the issue. If the political set-up is not able to set things right the constituency will put pressure.
There is a general lack of knowledge in every sphere about how much skill and knowledge an armed forces personnel brings with him. However, their skills are increasingly being utilised by the private sector. One wonders why the country doesn't use this resource. Why don't we learn from other countries when it comes to the matter of national security, planning and strategy.
Look at the world's most powerful democracy, the United States of America. They have been regularly utilising the services of specialists from the armed forces. Their set-up is such that their commanders' such as the Pacific Commander the Central Commander' are directly answerable to the President. The advice of the chairman, joint chiefs of staff, is a very critical component in the policy making on national security and strategic issues. At a time when we aspire to be a world power, and already call ourselves a regional power, we will have to finetune our security set-up and the way it is used. In our country a soldier is not regarded as a special person during peace time. He is remembered only during the time of war and then is again forgotten.
Somewhere in between, we lost the focus on hard power and started putting more emphasis on soft power. But why is it that every time there is a war, there is one-to-one interaction of the ministers with the armed forces chiefs? It can be done regularly during the peace time as well and without any mediators. It was believed that things would improve with the appointment of Integrated Chief of Defence Staff, but it has not happened so far.
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Post independence, the national security and strategy decision making was taken over by the intelligence people. They had direct access to the Prime Minister. Usually they had long, stable tenures. B N Mallick served for 12 years, R N Kao for eight years and so on. Even M K Narayanan has had two tenures of four years each. Now, since they were close to the decision makers, it is quite obvious that their influence on the policy was far higher than it should have been. At that time, even the armed forces chiefs had to go through the bureaucratic interface before they could pitch in their advice. This changed in between for some time when an institution named the National Security Advisor was created, and it became a convergence point.
The awareness on the military and national security matters in our country is abysmal. It is really unfortunate that even after 60 years of independence, we have not been able to start an informed debate on the matters of national security. The lack of knowledge of these issues among our political class is what makes them wary of armed forces people. Therefore, it has become a vicious cycle' the less you know, the less you consult. We must change this trend. We have had people at the helm who had good knowledge of security issues. Former defence secretary A V Singh was a person who understood the nuances of security and defence quite well.
We need to understand that hard power is as important as soft power is. The specialists from the armed forces should be brought in right from the begining while formulating plans on national security. It will give a chance to the armed forces to give their opinion at the right time. Usually, security forces are consulted at the last moment, when it's already too late. The retired armed forces officers can play a very important role as they are the ones who can create public awareness and start an informed discourse. They can be part of the think tanks, can be members of certain committees or can work as advisors to ministers as and when required. Armed with the concrete information and counsel that these retired officers can provide, the politicians will surely be in a better position to take informed decisions on key security issues. 'General' atrophy This process, at the same time, will inform the consituency from below and if the people are informed on vital issues, they can put pressure on their representatives to take the right decisions. This will have double impact as in the first place the politician himself is informed and then the public will take up the issue. If the political set-up is not able to set things right the constituency will put pressure.
There is a general lack of knowledge in every sphere about how much skill and knowledge an armed forces personnel brings with him. However, their skills are increasingly being utilised by the private sector. One wonders why the country doesn't use this resource. Why don't we learn from other countries when it comes to the matter of national security, planning and strategy.
Look at the world's most powerful democracy, the United States of America. They have been regularly utilising the services of specialists from the armed forces. Their set-up is such that their commanders' such as the Pacific Commander the Central Commander' are directly answerable to the President. The advice of the chairman, joint chiefs of staff, is a very critical component in the policy making on national security and strategic issues. At a time when we aspire to be a world power, and already call ourselves a regional power, we will have to finetune our security set-up and the way it is used. In our country a soldier is not regarded as a special person during peace time. He is remembered only during the time of war and then is again forgotten.
Somewhere in between, we lost the focus on hard power and started putting more emphasis on soft power. But why is it that every time there is a war, there is one-to-one interaction of the ministers with the armed forces chiefs? It can be done regularly during the peace time as well and without any mediators. It was believed that things would improve with the appointment of Integrated Chief of Defence Staff, but it has not happened so far.
For More IIPM Info, Visit below mentioned IIPM articles.
Best Colleges for Vocational Courses in India
IIPM BBA MBA Institute: Student Notice Board
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